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FOREIGN MINISTER FERNANDO MORÁN 
 ADDRESSES THE QUESTION OF GIBRALTAR (1982-1985)
Juan antonio Yáñez-Barnuevo1
I. THE BACKGROUND
What has happened during the final stages of  negotiations to reach an 
agreement on the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union 
(commonly known as Brexit), in which the question of  Gibraltar unexpectedly 
and to the surprise of  many became a last minute obstacle that had to be 
overcome in order successfully to conclude this complex process, serves to 
remind us of  several things. Fundamentally, it clearly evidences the centrality 
of  Gibraltar not only as regards Anglo-Spanish relations, but also in terms of  
the tripartite relations between Spain, the UK and the EU. It is well known 
that Gibraltar has been a permanent source of  friction between Spain and 
Great Britain for more than three centuries, but all too often we forget that it 
has also been a European problem —with ramifications that stretch beyond 
the continent— for over three decades, ever since the UK and Spain began 
to share the status of  EU Member States.
The abundant literature on Gibraltar —particularly in Spanish and 
English, but also in other languages— contains a variety of  similes and 
1 Ambassador of  Spain. This article is based on a chapter by the author, entitled “Fernando 
Morán y la cuestión de Gibraltar”, which appeared in the collective work in tribute to Fernando 
Morán: Á. Cuesta, A. López pina and J. A. Yáñez-Barnuevo (eds.), El lugar de España en 
las relaciones internacionales. Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, Unión Europea y Cooperación/ 
Principado de Asturias, Madrid/Oviedo, 2019, pp. 257-283. That contribution has been not 
just translated into English, but also adapted and updated for this publication.
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metaphors used to describe the anomalous situation of  a foreign colony on 
European soil: it is called, e. g., a “stone in the shoe”, a “thorn in the side” or 
a “sore thumb”, expressions often reflecting the Spanish perspective but also 
sometimes the perceptions of  the rest of  continental Europe. Naturally, the 
view from London is quite different: there, Gibraltar is commonly seen as an 
apparently impregnable Rock, the remaining bastion of  a vanished empire 
and a lasting symbol of  past, now withered glories.
Fernando Morán (1926-2020) saw all of  this with great clarity. He 
was always highly aware of  Gibraltar’s importance with respect to Spain’s 
international position in Europe and the world and he actively engaged with 
the question prior to his appointment as Foreign Minister, then throughout 
his tenure between December 1982 and July 1985, and also repeatedly in his 
subsequent memoirs, reflections and analyses2. Few foreign ministers during 
Spain’s democratic period have shown such an interest in this matter, have 
explored it in such depth or have elucidated the factors involved with such 
perception and sensitivity with a view to finding an equitable and lasting 
solution.
In his approach to the question of  Gibraltar, Morán always demonstrated 
three qualities that exerted a strong influence on his political thought in 
the international arena: a healthy Spanish patriotism, a profound belief  in 
democracy and deeply held pro-Europe convictions. These three tenets are 
evident in his writings on various international issues, but most specifically in 
relation to Gibraltar, and they inspired his political and diplomatic activities 
during his tenure as Foreign Minister in the first socialist Government led by 
Felipe González in the modern democratic era.
As a good Spanish patriot, Morán was fully aware of  the heavy burden that 
Gibraltar has always been for Spain, primarily at military and strategic level but 
also from the standpoint of  Spanish foreign policy in Europe and worldwide3. 
For this reason, he wrote that reclaiming Gibraltar “constitutes a national 
2 In particular, see his books Una política exterior para España (Planeta, Barcelona, 1980) and 
España en su sitio (Plaza &Janés/Cambio16, Barcelona, 1990) and his articles “Atención a 
Gibraltar”, El País (24 March 1988), “Las relaciones hispano-británicas”, Revista de Occidente, 
no. 89 (October 1988) and “Gibraltar, diez años después”, El País (28 November 1994).
3 “For any Spanish Government, the persistence of  a foreign colony on its territory, Gibraltar, 
is an intolerable situation”: F. Morán: España en su sitio, p. 97.
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cause”, shared in some way by all political forces in Spain4. In this respect, 
Morán undoubtedly followed in the footsteps of  one of  his predecessors, 
Fernando M. Castiella, under whom he had served for several years as a 
career diplomat, primarily involved in African and decolonization issues. He 
shared Castiella’s conviction that Spain should leverage the 1960s wave of  
decolonization to gain a foothold in the United Nations, thus strengthening 
the legitimacy of  the Spanish claim through the adoption of  a more modern 
and progressive approach, adjusted to the changing international conditions5.
However, Morán’s patriotism sprang from deep liberal and social 
democratic roots, and should not to be confused with the traditional 
nationalism of  Castiella and his team, which was still imbued with an 
essentialist vision of  Spain and its role in the world, in which the claim to 
Gibraltar played a major part due to its unique symbolism. Indeed, in the 
book in which he systematically outlined his vision of  Spain’s international 
position, Morán explicitly rejected the “autocratic nationalism” which he felt 
had characterised Castiella’s long tenure as Foreign Minister (1957-1969), as 
well as his “substitution policies” aimed at winning support among Latin 
American, Arab and African countries to compensate for the repeated slights 
that the Franco regime received from Western European democracies6.
The same could be said of  his profound democratic convictions and 
his liberal approach to the question of  Gibraltar7. In the same book, Morán 
rejected the Franco regime’s dogged refusal during Castiella’s term of  office 
to recognise the situation and rights of  the population of  Gibraltar or the 
importance of  the human relations of  all kinds between Gibraltar and the 
4 F. Morán, Una política exterior, p. 249. Morán wrote this book when he was a PSOE senator 
for Asturias and was also working professionally as a lecturer at the Diplomatic School. On 
the Spaniards’ attitudes toward Gibraltar over centuries, it is useful to consult the anthology 
by G. arMangué, Gibraltar y los españoles, Aguilar, Madrid, 1964.
5 See Una política exterior..., in particular pp. 250-256.
6 In the book cited, see in particular the introduction (pp. 13-14) and the first part (“¿Qué 
posición internacional le es posible a España? [What international position is possible for 
Spain?]”, pp. 15 et seq.).
7 Morán’s activism in democratic opposition to the dictatorship dated back to the mid-1950s, 
when he participated —on behalf  a group led by E. Tierno Galván— in the creation of  a 
clandestine anti-Francoist platform encompassing several dissident groups, called Democratic 
Action. This is noted in J. Benet et al., Dionisio Ridruejo, de la Falange a la oposición, Taurus, 
Madrid, 1976, p. 348.
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surrounding area of  Campo de Gibraltar, even going so far as to peremptorily 
cut communications between both sides in June 1969 (what came to be known 
as the “cierre de la verja” or closure of  the fence separating Gibraltar from 
the surrounding region). Writing in 1980, one decade after the introduction 
of  this measure, when it was already possible to assess its consequences, 
Morán energetically condemned its negative repercussions for Campo de 
Gibraltar and the adverse effects on the population of  Gibraltar, which felt 
increasingly divorced from Spain8.
Morán therefore advocated a very different, much more pragmatic and 
imaginative approach based on a better knowledge of  human realities on 
the ground and a fuller understanding of  the needs and aspirations of  the 
populations involved, both in Gibraltar and in Campo de Gibraltar, seeking 
rapprochement and mutual understanding without prejudice to the respective 
positions of  principle. He did not restrict himself  to recommending this 
route; prior to taking up his ministerial appointment, he was actively involved 
between 1979 and 1982 in several meetings and debates of  this kind held in 
various locations. In the first place, he took part in a seminar held in Segovia 
in late 1979 with the participation of  Spanish, British and Gibraltarian 
experts9. Then he visited Gibraltar in August 1982 by way of  Tangiers – 
because of  the travel restrictions then in effect -, meeting with the Chief  
Minister, Joshua Hassan, and with the head of  the opposition, Joe Bossano, 
and taking part in a televised debate with the British MEP Lord Douro and 
a panel of  Gibraltarian citizens, where he expounded his views and listened 
to their concerns10.
8 See Una política exterior… cit., especially pp. 258-262. With great foresight, Morán warned 
that Gibraltarian identity would be reinforced until becoming a “quasi-nationalism”. 
9 See p. 269 in the same book, citing the seminar held in Segovia in December 1979, organised 
by the Instituto de Cuestiones Internacionales, which some time later published a book, with 
a preface by A. Marquina, collecting the reports submitted and the discussions held at that 
seminar, entitled La descolonización de Gibraltar (Madrid, 1981).
10 In the memoirs of  his time as Foreign Minister, Morán also referred to frequent contacts 
with Gibraltarian political and social leaders, particularly laborites and trade unionists, both 
before and during his ministerial term: see España en su sitio, especially pp. 101-102. It is 
important to note that Morán, while visiting Gibraltar in a personal capacity, was at that 
time a PSOE senator as well as a lecturer at the Sapnish Diplomatic School. (The author is 
especially indebted to Juan Carmona, then Mayor of  La Línea, who accompanied Morán 
in his visit to Gibraltar in August 1982, and to Peter Montegriffo, who participated in the 
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The European dimension should also not be forgotten. Since his youth, 
Morán had always been a fervent pro-Europe advocate. Following early post-
graduate study periods in France and Britain right after the end of  the Second 
World War —at a time when few Spaniards did this— he participated in the 
creation of  the Association for the Functional Unity of  Europe, founded 
by Professor Enrique Tierno Galván, Presciently, he even devoted his final 
report as a graduating student at the Madrid Diplomatic School to a subject 
related to the construction of  Europe, then in its infancy11. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that Morán focused on the issue of  Gibraltar and its fundamental 
Anglo-Spanish dimension from a European perspective.
Thus, in his writings, Morán stressed that a democratic Spain which aspired 
to inclusion in European institutions was in a position to stake its claim to the 
Rock in a very different form to that adopted by the Franco regime. At the 
same time, he noted that what at first glance appeared to be a challenge —the 
need, ultimately, to lift the restrictions imposed in 1969, which still hindered 
communications between Gibraltar and the surrounding Spanish territory, 
as part of  Spain’s entry into the EEC— could also be turned to advantage, 
if  this integration process were leveraged to achieve progress in substantive 
negotiations on the Anglo-Spanish dispute over Gibraltar12.
II. THE INITIATIVE
As Morán himself  highlighted in his writings, the most notable aspect 
of  his activities from the very start of  his tenure as Foreign Minister (from 
December 1982 to June 1985) revolved around these two questions: achieving 
Spain’s entry into the EEC and making decisive progress on the question 
of  Gibraltar. In fact, these two issues —often intertwined— dominate his 
memoir of  that period, without neglecting the many other issues that no 
Gibraltar TV debate, for their personal recollections of  that visit, in communications dated 
April 2020).
11 F. Morán, El proyecto de una Comunidad Agrícola Europea y España. Memoria de Fin de 
Estudios en la Escuela Diplomática [Final Report to the Diplomatic School], Madrid, March 
1954 (unpublished).
12 This idea, which was outlined in Una política exterior..., was further developed in España en su 
sitio, as a reflection and outcome of  Morán’s ministerial experience in this field. 
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doubt also demanded his attention in the frenetic years of  Spain’s increasing 
openness to the outside world13.
Without exaggeration, one can say that these two issues formed Morán’s 
priority from the first to last days of  his time as Minister14. One of  the 
first measures taken by the new Government —announced by President 
Felipe González in his inaugural speech to the Congress of  Deputies in late 
November 198215— was to authorise pedestrian traffic between Gibraltar and 
the surrounding area, which was enshrined in a decision of  the first meeting 
of  the Council of  Ministers held in early December 1982 and resulted in 
the opening of  the fence in the middle of  the same month. This unilateral 
gesture by the Spanish Government was very well received by the populations 
on both sides and was aimed at creating a new climate for relations between 
the two countries and showing that Spain’s historical claim to Gibraltar could 
be pursued in a very different manner from before16.
Subsequently, under the impulse and at the direction of  President 
González, Morán worked intensively to unblock the negotiations for Spain’s 
13 In general, on the evolution of  Spain’s international policy during the period in question, 
see the chapter by J. A. Yáñez-Barnuevo and Á. viñas, “Diez años de política exterior del 
gobierno socialista (1982-1992)”, in A. Guerra and J. F. Tezanos (eds.), La década del cambio. 
Diez años de gobierno socialista, 1982-1992. Sistema, Madrid, 1992, pp. 85-133. For a broader 
perspective over time, see the book by F. viLLar, La Transición exterior de España. Del aislamiento 
a la influencia (1976-1996), Marcial Pons, Madrid, 2016. 
14 According to the assessment of  Ángel Viñas, a close associate of  Morán during the latter’s 
ministerial term: “Gibraltar was one of  Morán’s essential concerns, to which he devoted 
unswerving and constant attention with imagination, forward vision and unsurpassable 
empathy”: A. viñas, “Dos hombres para la transición externa: Fernando Morán y Francisco 
Fernández Ordóñez”, Historia Contemporánea, no. 15 (1996), pp. 257-288.
15 In that speech, Felipe González, when presenting the new Government’s program, took 
care to stress that one of  its priorities in foreign policy would be to work for the reintegration 
of  Gibraltar into Spain´s national territory through negotiations with Britain according to 
the relevant UN resolutions.
16 Besides Morán’s ministerial memoirs, see the article by A. Marquina: “Gibraltar en la 
política exterior del Gobierno socialista”, Revista de Estudios Internacionales, vol. 6, no. 4 
(October-December 1985), pp. 880-905. For a broader perspective, see the illuminating study 
by A. reMiro: “Regreso a Gibraltar: encuentros y desencuentros hispano-británicos”, in A. 
del Valle and I. González (eds.): Gibraltar 300 años, Universidad de Cádiz, 2004, pp. 43-84, 
as well as his article on “Gibraltar en la política exterior de España”, Cuadernos de Gibraltar/
Gibraltar Reports, Universidad de Cádiz, no. 2, 2016-2017, pp. 27-40.
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entry into the EEC, and especially to overcome the reservations of  the 
French Government, while simultaneously devoting himself  to methodically 
preparing the ground to revive Anglo-Spanish discussions in relation to 
Gibraltar. This was not an easy task because a few months before, in April 
1982, the UK and Argentina had engaged in armed conflict over the Malvinas/
Falkland Islands, and one of  the consequences of  this confrontation had 
been the suspension sine die of  implementation of  the provisions of  the 
Lisbon Declaration, signed in April 1980 by Foreign Ministers Oreja and 
Carrington, which had marked a first step towards conciliation of  the two 
countries’ positions with a view to “resolving all differences over Gibraltar”17.
Morán was conscious of  the difficulty of  such an endeavour under these 
circumstances, but he was also convinced of  the need to make progress 
in parallel with negotiations on Spain’s entry into the EEC, which would 
necessarily entail Spain’s acceptance of  the existing acquis communautaire with 
regard to Gibraltar, a territory placed within an EEC framework as a result 
of  the UK’s accession in 1973 and whose special regime was particularly 
favourable to its interests. Thus, following some disappointing initial contacts 
with his British colleague, Francis Pym, he decided to aim higher, travelling to 
London in March 1983 to meet face to face with the British Prime Minister, 
Margaret Thatcher. On several occasions, Morán recounted the circumstances 
of  this difficult meeting with Mrs Thatcher, then at the apex of  her political 
career and not inclined, after her victory in the Falklands, to cede an inch to 
Spain on the issue of  Gibraltar. As was to be expected, the collision of  views 
between the two interlocutors did not produce immediate results, but at least 
it left the Prime Minister impressed by the seriousness and determination of  
the Spanish Government in regard to this matter18.
17 In España en su sitio, Morán had no qualms about considering the Lisbon Declaration as “an 
important milestone on the path towards a negotiated solution” (p. 104), although he also 
criticised some of  its deficiencies and ambiguities. The text of  the Declaration is given in the 
book La cuestión de Gibraltar, published by the Office for Gibraltar Affairs, of  the Ministry of  
Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Madrid, 2008, pp. 125-126. (Also published in an English 
version: The question of  Gibraltar).
18 With humour, Morán entitled the corresponding heading in his memoirs: “Las conversaciones 
en Londres. Mrs. Thatcher y yo salimos indemnes de un choque [Conversations in London. 
Mrs Thatcher and I emerge unscathed from a collision]” (España en su sitio, pp. 109-112). For 
a witness account of  that meeting, see the remembrances of  one of  his close collaborators: 
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Nevertheless, Spanish diplomats were hard-pressed for quite some 
months because their British counterparts insisted on continuing to invoke 
an exchange of  notes between the two Governments made in January 
1982, coinciding with an official visit to London by President Calvo-Sotelo 
accompanied by Foreign Minister Pérez-Llorca. Inspired by the desire to 
achieve implementation of  the 1980 Lisbon Declaration, this unfortunate 
diplomatic document seemed to support some of  the British Government’s 
arguments concerning interpretation and implementation of  the Declaration19. 
Meanwhile, the new Spanish Government stressed, among other things, that 
the notes exchanged immediately prior to the Malvinas/Falklands conflict had 
been superseded by subsequent events which had hindered their application, 
and that hence these should be set aside and discussions begun ex novo in 
order to implement the Lisbon Declaration from a fresh perspective.
During this period of  unsuccessful diplomatic exchanges, Morán once 
again demonstrated the close interest and attention he paid to the human 
and social dimensions of  the problem by visiting Campo de Gibraltar in July 
1983 to give a lecture at the summer courses held in San Roque, seizing the 
opportunity to establish direct contact with local figures and send messages to 
the media announcing the socialist Government’s new approach to the issue20.
Eventually, Morán’s determination and tenacity were rewarded when an 
abrupt change at the head of  the UK Foreign Office paved the way for fresh 
F. sChwartz, “Morán en su sitio”, in Cuesta, López Pina and Yáñez-Barnuevo (eds.): El lugar 
de España…, 2019, pp. 123-130. 
19 On this episode, see the article by A. Marquina: “La entrevista Calvo-Sotelo-Thatcher: fin 
e inicio de un proceso en Gibraltar”, Revista de Estudios Internacionales, vol. 3, no. 1 (October-
December 1982), pp. 125-136. 
20 In particular, Morán indicated that the new Government would be attentive not just to the 
interests of  the Gibraltarians - as had been the position of  previous Spanish Governments - but 
also to their mentality and feelings, while carefully distinguishing this position from the UK’s 
insistence on having regard to their “wishes” (personal recollection of  the author, corroborated 
by the testimony of  Fernando Schwartz, then head of  the Diplomatic Information Office at 
the Foreign Ministry, in a communication dated 6 April 2020).This new, more open approach 
was the subject of  generally favourable news reports and comments published in August and 
September 1983 by various important British journals, especially in The Times (“Spain takes 
softer line on the Rock”, 2 August 1983, and “Eight crucial issues on Gibraltar”, 26 September 
1983), The Economist (“Foundering on the Rock”, 20-26 August 1983) and Financial Times 
(“Howe hopes to heal rift with Spain over Gibraltar”, 2 September 1983).
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perspectives on the question also from the British side. Following a general 
election in the UK in June 1983, which gave Mrs Thatcher a larger majority 
in Westminster, the British Government was reshuffled and the rigid and 
reserved Pym was replaced by Geoffrey Howe, until then Chancellor of  the 
Exchequer. Howe, who was clearly a higher calibre politician and a heavy 
weight in the Government and the Conservative Party, began to consider the 
issue of  Gibraltar in a different light, from a European perspective, with a 
view to achieving another type of  relationship with Spain, both on a bilateral 
level and eventually within the EEC21.
Shortly afterwards, in September, Morán and Howe met on two occasions: 
first in Madrid, at the successful conclusion of  the Conference on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (largely thanks to the initiative taken by Spain 
under the leadership of  Felipe González and Fernando Morán), and later in 
New York, during the annual session of  the General Assembly of  the UN. 
From that time onwards, the game changed: both Ministers agreed to put 
aside the notes exchanged in January 1982 and set in motion an increasingly 
intensive dialogue between them and their closest collaborators aimed at 
finding the means to achieve concrete and effective progress on the question 
of  Gibraltar and to facilitate Spain’s smooth accession to the EEC.
III. THE BREAKTHROUGH
This direct contact between the two Ministers and their respective teams 
intensified in early 1984, with meetings in London, Madrid, Brussels and 
Luxembourg, in parallel to the negotiations regarding Spain’s accession to 
21 On Howe and his view of  the problem, see his memoirs: howe, G., Conflict of  loyalty, 
Macmillan, London, 1994. Of  most relevance to the question discussed here was the argument 
Howe presented to the Prime Minister on 9 September 1983, according to which the UK 
should take advantage of  the negotiations on accession to the EEC in order to achieve a new 
stage in relations with Spain in such a way that the issue of  Gibraltar did not overshadow 
everything else; he added that this was a pressing question because if  this were not achieved, 
it could hinder EEC enlargement negotiations (pp. 308 and 318). The Foreign Secretary must 
have been convincing because this considerably more flexible and constructive strategy was 
soon adopted by the British Government. Morán commended Howe and his memoirs, which 
had just been published, in his article “Diez años después”, El País, 28 November 1994.
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the EEC22. At the meeting between the two Ministers held in Brussels in 
February, it was made clear that Spain would not defer or withdraw its claim 
to Gibraltar as the price for achieving entry into the EEC. Shortly afterwards, 
Howe sent Morán a message stating that achieving bilateral progress on the 
question of  Gibraltar would be important in order to reach the final stretch 
of  EEC negotiations on accession.
Thus, a new stage began, by clarifying the two countries’ respective 
positions and the possible formulas for an agreement, starting on the bilateral 
talks held in Luxembourg in April. On that occasion, the British side submitted 
a proposal containing a key idea that would help resolve many of  the questions 
pending between the two countries in relation to implementation of  the 
Lisbon Declaration, in particular as regards the objective of  equality and 
reciprocity of  rights between citizens of  Spain and Gibraltar. This formula 
was that Spain and the UK would, by a bilateral agreement, mutually uphold 
the rights enshrined in EEC law that would be applicable following Spain’s 
accession (an undertaking that would clearly be based on the joint conviction 
that Spain would soon become an EEC member). This was tantamount to 
advance compliance with the acquis communautaire, agreed bilaterally with regard 
to Gibraltar (something that at the time was known as advanced implementation, 
although this designation did not subsequently appear in the Declaration of  
Brussels)23.
Morán immediately realised the benefits of  the UK’s new approach, which 
had now shifted from threatening —or at least hinting at threatening— to 
prevent Spain’s entry into the EEC if  it did not beforehand lift the restrictions 
imposed on Gibraltar (the line previously taken by the British Government, 
and especially its Parliament) to accepting that Spain would soon join the 
EEC and planning to take advantage of  this circumstance to negotiate an 
agreement to lift those restrictions in advance (thus also gaining a valuable ally 
22 In Spain, Morán’s main collaborators in this process —as he relates in his memoirs with 
characteristic generosity— were: in his Cabinet, its head, José Luis Dicenta, and a specialist 
on UK matters, Francisco José Mayans; in the Directorate-General for Europe, its director, 
Mariano Berdejo, and the diplomats Carlos Vinuesa and Jaime Rodríguez-Ponga; in the office 
of  the Secretary of  State for the EEC, the second in command (and future Foreign Minister), 
Carlos Westendorp; in the Diplomatic Information Office, its director, Fernando Schwartz; 
and in the London Embassy, the Ambassador, José Joaquín Puig de la Bellacasa. 
23 See España en su sitio, pp. 378-379.
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in other areas of  the enlargement negotiations). However, it was necessary 
to ensure that the details of  the proposed agreement genuinely reflected the 
principles set forth in the Lisbon Declaration—fundamentally, reciprocity 
and equality of  rights— and to secure its effective implementation over and 
above the laws applicable in  Gibraltar. Spanish officials and technicians 
applied themselves to this task in the following months, toiling in joint 
working groups established for this purpose.
Howe and Morán met again in Washington in May, in parallel with the 
spring ministerial meeting of  the North Atlantic Council, where they took 
stock of  the technical work made in an attempt to clarify and define the 
terms of  the envisaged advanced implementation and began to address the 
more strictly political aspects of  the negotiations. In particular, Morán had 
several strategic objectives: to achieve a new instrument based on the Lisbon 
Declaration that would clarify and improve it; to ensure that the instrument 
expressly mentioned that the issues of  sovereignty would form part of  future 
negotiations between both governments24; to define in greater detail the 
format, level and frequency of  these negotiations; and to ensure that Spain’s 
accession to the EEC was not to be interpreted as modifying Spain’s titles 
or claims to Gibraltar. All of  these issues were addressed in the following 
months and subsequently reflected in the documents agreed upon by the 
parties between late 1984 and mid-1985. After the Washington meeting, the 
common goal was to work together on an instrument that would go beyond 
the Lisbon Declaration.
Following months of  intensive work by senior officials, the Ministers 
met again in September in New York, during the UN General Assembly 
session. There, they considered the draft document resulting from this work, 
and Howe consented to the explicit inclusion in the text of  a phrase which 
would reflect the agreement by both sides that “the issues of  sovereignty” 
would be discussed in the negotiating process to be opened between the 
two Governments (albeit with the proviso that the UK would maintain 
24 Besides its intrinsic importance, Morán’s insistence on this point was also a reaction to 
public statements made by British political leaders —including Mrs Thatcher— following 
the Falklands war to the effect that the envisaged negotiations on the Lisbon Declaration 
“aimed at resolving all differences over Gibraltar” would not include the issue of  sovereignty. 
In light of  these statements, some of  them made in Parliament, Morán was determined to 
rule out all possible ambiguity in this respect.
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its commitment to uphold the freely expressed wishes of  the people of  
Gibraltar25). At the same time, Morán announced that Spain intended to 
formulate a generic claim to rights over Gibraltar when signing the Act of  
Accession to the EEC and he proposed the joint formulation of  a protocol 
or exchange of  notes between the two Governments to reflect this position. 
Although the Spanish and British teams still continued to work for several 
weeks to refine the details, the general contours of  the agreement reached 
between the two Ministers was now clear.
Throughout this long negotiating process, Morán always maintained 
President González fully informed, and in turn received his leader’s strong 
support for the successive steps taken. Given the multiple domestic 
repercussions involved, especially in the area of  Campo de Gibraltar, two 
meetings of  the Council of  Ministers were held at this time, which were 
entirely devoted to review all aspects of  the question in detail26.
Eventually, these convoluted but successful negotiations culminated in 
the formalisation of  the Declaration of  Brussels on 27 November 1984, 
announced at the end of  the meeting held by Morán and Howe and their 
respective teams27. The Declaration of  Brussels was explicitly based on the 
Lisbon Declaration, some aspects of  which it clarified while others it extended 
or complemented. In essence, it envisaged the simultaneous implementation 
(a key element of  the agreement), before 15 February 1985, of  three processes 
considered interdependent.
The first of  these was to establish equality and reciprocity of  rights for 
Spanish citizens in Gibraltar and Gibraltar citizens in Spain (based on the 
principle of  mutual concession of  rights granted to citizens of  EEC countries 
and the general principle of  EEC preference). The second was to establish 
the free movement of  persons, vehicles and goods between Gibraltar and 
the surrounding territory (which generally became known as “full opening of  
25 The British side constantly referred to the commitment contained in the preamble to 
the 1969 Constitution of  Gibraltar (a charter granted by the UK through the Gibraltar 
Constitution Order of  23 May 1969), according to which “Her Majesty’s Government will 
never enter into arrangements under which the people of  Gibraltar would pass under the 
sovereignty of  another state against their freely and democratically expressed wishes”.
26 Morán made express mention of  both aspects in España en su sitio, passim.
27 For the text of  the Declaration, see the previously cited publication, La cuestión de Gibraltar, 
Madrid, 2008, pp. 127-128.
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the fence”). The third was to establish a negotiating process aimed at resolving 
all differences over Gibraltar (which expressly included “the issues of  
sovereignty”, as Spain wished, accompanied by the inevitable British reminder 
of  its commitment to the people of  Gibraltar), and to promote cooperation 
in various fields for mutual benefit.
It was envisaged that work on the various aspects of  the negotiating process 
would be carried out by specialised working groups, with periodic meetings 
between the two Foreign Ministers in order to monitor progress made. 
Although no timeframe was specified for these meetings, the understanding 
between the parties was that the ministerial meetings would take place at least 
once a year28.
Subsequently, the Spanish and British Governments agreed that these 
processes would be simultaneously launched at a ministerial meeting to be 
held in Geneva on 5 February 1985. In the period between the meetings in 
Brussels and Geneva, close contact was maintained at various levels to prepare 
in meticulous detail for the giant step forwards that the Geneva meeting 
represented, culminating in a prior meeting between the two Ministers on 28 
January in Brussels, in parallel with an EEC enlargement negotiation session. 
On that occasion, they agreed that the Chief  Minister of  Gibraltar, Joshua 
Hassan, and mayors from the Campo de Gibraltar area would be invited 
to participate in the Geneva talks, forming part of  the respective British 
and Spanish delegations. However, Morán insisted that they should only 
intervene on issues concerning practical cooperation in the area, and under 
no circumstances on issues related to sovereignty, which would be the sole 
preserve of  the two Governments29.
28 Morán gave a detailed presentation of  the Declaration and the resultant negotiating process 
at a meeting of  the Foreign Affairs Committee of  the Congress of  Deputies held on 21 
December 1984. His parliamentary interventions on that occasion are given in a Diplomatic 
Information Office publication, Discursos y declaraciones del Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores D. 
Fernando Morán, Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, Madrid, 1984, pp. 125-149. 
29 España en su sitio, pp. 429-430. A notable Gibraltarian politician and author, K. Azopardi, 
has recognised that the 1984 Brussels Declaration and its subsequent negotiating process 
was a high point of  the bilateral (UK-Spain) approach to the future status of  Gibraltar, an 
approach which he decries in his interesting book azopardi, K., Sovereignty and the stateless 
nation: Gibraltar in the modern legal context, Hart, Oxford, 2009, pp. 100 et seq.
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With this package of  measures in place, negotiations on the question of  
Gibraltar entered a completely new stage, and what later become known as 
the “Brussels Process” was set in motion30.
IV. THE VISION
At the “Conferencia negociadora de Ginebra” [Negotiating conference 
in Geneva]31, Morán outlined his vision of  the question of  Gibraltar and the 
best way to address it going forwards, obviously from a Spanish perspective 
but also recognising the rights and interests of  the UK and the Gibraltarians. 
He did this in two speeches he gave in the plenary sessions: the first of  these 
examined the questions of  cooperation and sovereignty in general, while the 
second was somewhat more detailed and focused on the issues of  sovereignty. 
This latter was accompanied by Spanish proposals that Morán presented to 
Howe as “ideas” in a private meeting between the two Ministers, which were 
then formalised in writing and sent to London via diplomatic channels on 
26 February. These documents —which were undoubtedly written with great 
care and bore the Minister’s personal stamp— summarised Morán’s thought 
concerning the future status of  Gibraltar and future relations between Spain 
and the UK (and Gibraltar) within a broader European framework32.
30 For contemporary assessments —with some criticisms— of  what was achieved at the 
time, see A. Marquina: “El contencioso de Gibraltar. La apertura de un nuevo proceso”, in 
Las relaciones de vecindad (IX Jornadas de la Asociación Española de Profesores de Derecho 
Internacional y Relaciones Internacionales, 1985), Universidad del País Vasco, 1987, pp. 
133-141) and “El contencioso de Gibraltar después de la Declaración de Bruselas”, in Liber 
amicorum Profesor José Pérez Montero, Universidad de Oviedo, 1988, vol. II, pp. 673-891. 
31 As he called it in the corresponding chapter of  his memoirs: España en su sitio, p. 428 et seq.
32 Unfortunately, these documents have never been published, even though more than thirty 
years have passed since that historic conference. (In the author’s judgment, it is high time 
that this omission was rectified). What is publicly known to date about them basically comes 
from Morán’s memoirs (España en su sitio, pp. 430-433) and from the Minister’s statement in 
his appearance before the Foreign Affairs Committee of  the Congress of  Deputies to give an 
account of  the Geneva Conference, at a meeting held on 7 March 1985. Morán’s interventions 
on that occasion are given in the Diplomatic Information Office publication: Discursos y 
declaraciones del Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores D. Fernando Morán (enero-junio 1985), Ministerio de 
Asuntos Exteriores, Madrid, 1985, pp. 65-129. For the Gibraltarian Chief  Minister’s version 
of  what happened in Geneva on that occasion, see the book by William JaCkson and Francis 
Cantos, From fortress to democracy: the political biography of  Sir Joshua Hassan, Gibraltar Books, 
Grendon, 1995, p. 261 (the author is thankful to Juan Carmona for faciliting this reference).
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From the outset, Morán highlighted the fact that negotiations were 
entering a new phase, overcoming previous periods characterised by highly 
divergent positions, difficulties in establishing dialogue and intransigence on 
one side or the other. Similarly, he stressed the common goal towards which 
all should now strive: to transform the “Rock of  discord” into the “Rock 
of  concord”33. He emphasised that in accordance with the meaning and 
scope of  the Brussels Declaration, the objective of  the negotiations was to 
resolve all differences over Gibraltar, with respect both to cooperation and to 
the issues of  sovereignty. When addressing cooperation, he underlined that 
negotiations should seek to achieve mutually satisfactory results, focusing on 
the people and societies most directly affected, and perhaps even with the goal 
of  contributing to wider European solidarity.
Obviously, Morán paid greater attention to political issues and the issues 
of  sovereignty, which formed the core of  his interventions. As a starting 
point, he recalled that the ultimate objective of  the Spanish Government and 
people was to reincorporate Gibraltar into Spanish national territory. Having 
said that, he admitted the need to act realistically, bearing in mind the interests 
involved. Hence, he argued on the need to study mechanisms that would help 
reconcile all interests, not only those of  Spain and the UK but also those of  
the population of  Gibraltar. On this point, he evidenced his knowledge and 
even empathy for the feelings of  the Gibraltarians, insisting that the Spanish 
Government did not aspire to absorb or annex the population of  Gibraltar, but 
instead recognised its distinctive identity and characteristics, which qualified it 
for a self-government regime with specific but flexible criteria.
Moving on, Morán explained the meaning attached to the plural “issues of  
sovereignty” used in the Brussels Declaration, which included several aspects 
related to the exercise of  sovereignty over different spaces in Gibraltar34:
33 Morán’s play on words tacitly alluded to a well-known work by G. hiLLs: Rock of  contention. 
A history of  Gibraltar, Hale, London, 1974 (translated into Spanish as El Peñón de la discordia. 
Historia de Gibraltar, San Martín, Madrid, 1975)
34 In various places, Morán has referred above all to two pending issues of  sovereignty (the 
territory ceded in Utrecht and the occupied strip on the isthmus), undoubtedly considering 
that the other aspects (waters and airspace) were in some way ancillary to these central 
issues. Other authors have referred to five contentious territorial issues regarding Gibraltar. 
Depending on one’s approach, there may be even more: see the documented book by J. R. 
reMaCha: Gibraltar y sus límites, Trea, Gijón, 2015.
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a) the territory ceded in article X of  the 1713 Treaty of  Utrecht, which 
included the town and castle of  Gibraltar, together with its port, defences 
and fortress;
b) the strip of  the isthmus that extends between the ceded territory and 
the fence unilaterally erected by the UK in 1909; and
c) the adjacent waters and overlying airspace of  the above-mentioned 
territories. 
Morán summarised the long-standing Anglo-Spanish dispute over 
Gibraltar as consisting, on the one hand, of  a political difference (relative to 
the territory ceded in Utrecht), which might be amenable to a legal approach; 
and, on the other, a legal difference (relative to the isthmus), which might be 
approached from a political angle. He then reviewed the two issues, starting 
with the isthmus.
After stressing that the strip on the isthmus had never been ceded by 
Spain and recalling that the Kershaw Report produced in 1981 by the British 
Parliament35 had expressed doubts concerning sovereignty over this territory, 
including the airport, Morán urged that both parties address this problem 
initially from the standpoint of  practical and mutually beneficial cooperation, 
proposing that this could be attained by the removal of  the 1909 fence and an 
agreed joint use of  the airport.
Turning to the central issue —that of  the territory ceded in 1713— Morán 
underscored that Spain had respected the commitment made in Utrecht, 
despite its detrimental nature, but legitimately aspired to move beyond this 
anachronistic legacy which furthermore was at odds with contemporary 
international law on non-self-governing territories, in accordance with the 
relevant UN resolutions. Thus, Morán proposed replacing the existing legal 
framework, which he considered obsolete and unsustainable, with a new 
one based on a reasonable agreement between the two States that was not 
detrimental to the citizens of  Gibraltar, who would continue to exercise a high 
measure of  self-government.
Realising that this would require political will on both sides, and particularly 
on the part of  the UK, Morán appealed to the principles of  solidarity prevailing 
in Europe and to the fact that both States were modern constitutional and 
35 Report prepared by the Foreign Affairs Committee of  the House of  Commons, entitled 
Gibraltar: The situation of  Gibraltar and United Kingdom relations with Spain, House of  Commons, 
London, 22 July 1981.
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democratic monarchies, something which in his view should be conducive 
to replacing an outdated treaty between the two crowns —which had soured 
relations between the two countries for centuries — with a new bilateral 
agreement that would pave the way for future relations based on mutual 
understanding and close cooperation.
V. THE PROPOSAL
As for the “ideas” that Morán had presented to his colleague Howe in 
Geneva, which were subsequently formalised in writing and sent to London 
via diplomatic channels, these constituted a genuine plan aimed at solving all 
pending issues related to sovereignty, based on a comprehensive but gradual 
approach. The ultimate goal, clearly stated from the outset, was the return 
to Spain of  sovereignty over Gibraltar, thus restoring Spanish territorial 
integrity36. To this end, a two-stage process would be set in motion: the first 
stage, of  a transitional character, would lay the foundations for a solution 
to the outstanding issues in accordance with either of  two possible paths 
permitting a smooth, peaceful change; and the second phase, to be defined 
by bilateral agreement, would establish the definitive status of  the territory 
and its population37.
For the transitional stage, two alternative formulas were proposed for 
the legal regime to apply to Gibraltar over a given period of  time, to be 
agreed by both Governments38. It was understood that this regime would 
apply to all the spaces under discussion (the territory ceded in 1713, the 
subsequently occupied part of  the isthmus and the adjacent waters and the 
36 Obviously, before presenting these ideas and formalising the proposals, Morán consulted 
with President González, who firmly supported the Minister, while insisting that the full 
territorial reincorporation of  Gibraltar into Spain, albeit keeping a high degree of  self-
government for the population, should be emphasised in the proposal (personal recollection 
of  the author, who was at the time principal foreign policy adviser to President González).
37 In fact, although not explicitly stated in the plan, there would have been three stages: a 
prior stage of  negotiation (in which progress could be made in aspects of  cooperation such 
as joint use of  the airport); a transitional stage (for either of  the two proposed paths); and 
the final stage of  Gibraltar’s definitive status.
38 At no time was the length of  this proposed period defined. A few years later, when he 
was no longer a member of  the Government, Morán indicated that the transitional period 
“might reasonably extend to fifteen or twenty years” in his article “Las relaciones hispano-
británicas”, Revista de Occidente, no. 89 (October 1988), p. 17. 
CGIB03-yañez-estudios-moran.indd   17 06/05/2020   23:52:02
18
Cuadernos de Gibraltar – Gibraltar Reports
Número 3/Issue # 3, 2018-2019, 1301
ISSN 2444-7382
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.25267/Cuad_Gibraltar.2019.i3.1301
Foreign Minister Fernando Morán Addresses the Question of  Gibraltar (1982-1985)
overlying airspace over these territories, differentiating between them). The 
two alternative routes suggested were condominium (co-sovereignty) or 
a lease-back agreement, in either case to be governed by an international 
treaty between the two States which would set forth the specific conditions 
agreed, for a specified period of  time, after which Spain would hold exclusive 
sovereignty.
In the case of  co-sovereignty, both States would share, for a given period, 
the title to and exercise of  sovereignty, implemented through a joint body 
composed of  representatives of  both Governments. The bilateral treaty to 
be negotiated would basically cover: the duration of  co-sovereignty; the res-
pective territorial and personal powers of  the two States; the status of  the 
population of  Gibraltar (based on the already existing system of  self-govern-
ment); the nationality of  Gibraltarian citizens (based on their freely exercised 
individual choice); the organisation of  public services; the joint exercise of  
powers; regulations governing investment; regulations governing potential 
conflict of  laws, authorities or jurisdictions; territorial defence (including the 
status of  the military installations and regulations governing their use); and 
the peaceful settlement of  any disputes that might arise in the exercise of  
co-sovereignty39.
In the case of  the lease-back agreement, this would entail prior transfer 
of  sovereignty from the UK to Spain, with continuity in the temporary exer-
cise of  administration of  the territory by the UK through an agreement to 
that effect between the two States. This would require the conclusion of  a 
bilateral treaty that would govern the following matters, among others: trans-
fer of  sovereignty to Spain, immediate transfer of  the exercise of  sovereign 
39 As far as is known, this was the first time that Spain had suggested the possibility of  
exercising joint or shared sovereignty over Gibraltar with the UK. However, information has 
emerged in Foreign Office documents indicating that this idea had been considered internally 
for a long time, and that in 1978, the then Chief  Minister of  Gibraltar, Joshua Hassan, had 
suggested to the British authorities that they offer Spain “nominal” co-sovereignty, an idea that 
was eventually scrapped. See the news report, based on British National Archive documents, 
entitled: “The 1978 ‘nominal’ co-sovereignty project for Gibraltar, with UK, EEC and Spain’s 
guarantee”, MercoPress, 24 May 2014 (en.mercopress.com). For another contribution suggesting 
that the idea of  joint sovereignty may have had a Gibraltarian origin, see J. L. Caruana: “A 
brief  history on ‘joint sovereignty’”, Gibraltar Panorama, 8 July 2017.
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powers to the UK; duration of  the lease; and the conditions for the exercise 
of  the lease40.
During the transitional stage, Spain and the UK would negotiate the 
definitive status of  Gibraltar. The goal of  these negotiations would be to 
conclude an international treaty between the two States regulating the 
following questions, among others: the title to and exercise of  sovereignty 
by Spain in the final stage (with no time limit) and the conditions for use of  
the military base (which tacitly implied the possibility of  agreeing, beyond 
the transitional stage, on a scheme similar to that already in existence by an 
agreement on defence cooperation between Spain and the USA as regards 
“joint use military bases”, which subsequently became “operational and 
support installations and authorisations for use”).
With a view to this final or definitive stage, but separately from the 
bilateral treaty, it was envisaged that as regards the people of  Gibraltar, Spain 
would undertake to establish a specific regime with respect, inter alia, to the 
following matters: the political organisation of  Gibraltar, to be determined 
with the participation and approval of  the population of  Gibraltar; the 
structure and functioning of  the organs of  self-government; the political, 
economic, social and cultural rights of  the citizens of  Gibraltar, based on 
those they had enjoyed to date; the possibility of  Gibraltarians individually 
and freely choosing their nationality (British or Spanish); and the possibility 
of  designating English as the official language, if  the population of  Gibraltar 
so desired.
40 Again, this was the first time that the transfer of  sovereignty accompanied by a lease term 
(known in English law as “lease-back”) had been explored with respect to Gibraltar. However, 
sometime earlier (around 1980-1981) this had been the main mechanism considered in talks 
between representatives of  the UK and Argentina in an attempt to solve the question of  
the Malvinas/Falkland Islands, a negotiating process that was thwarted by the outbreak 
of  the Falklands war in April 1982. In his memoirs (Reflect on things past, Collins, London, 
1988, especially pp. 350-356), Lord Carrington, who had been Foreign Secretary at the time, 
mentioned the two mechanisms then considered (co-sovereignty and leaseback) but rapidly 
focused on the second option due to the multiple complications entailed in any regime of  co-
sovereignty, citing the example of  the Franco-British condominium over the New Hebrides, 
now the independent republic of  Vanuatu (pp. 333-334).
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VI. THE LEGACY
As is well known, Morán repeatedly observed that of  all of  his work as 
Minister, what he personally felt most satisfied with was how he had steered 
the question of  Gibraltar via the Brussels Declaration and the negotiating 
conference of  Geneva41. However, this affirmation must be viewed in 
perspective. What Morán undoubtedly wished to highlight was that whereas 
EEC negotiations had been the work of  the entire Government, under the 
leadership of  President González, to a large extent Gibraltar had been a 
personal effort, albeit one in pursuit a national cause and fully supported by 
the President, and that what had been achieved was in large part due to his 
own personal conviction and tenacity. Few could dispute the distinction he 
earnt in relation to Gibraltar42.
It does not appear that Morán was attempting here to minimise the 
importance of  the historic achievement that was Spain’s entry into the EEC, 
which according to general opinion constituted his greatest accomplishment 
as Minister, but rather that, with his characteristic modesty, he had always 
been aware that this was the work of  the entire Government, and especially 
of  President González, to which as Foreign Minister he had contributed 
all along and particularly at key moments by strengthening relations with 
France (first with his colleague Cheysson and then with Dumas), by fostering 
a new climate in relations with the UK, thanks to his good understanding 
with Howe, and by providing a decisive impetus to the final marathon at the 
41 See, for example, España en su sitio: “I have repeatedly said that while it fell to me to conclude 
negotiations with the Community (…), what I am most satisfied with in relation to my work 
as Minister was how I steered the question of  Gibraltar. It was a difficult and lengthy effort 
that demanded great determination, dedication, knowledge of  details and diplomatic tact” 
(pp. 382-383). “Right up until my last day as Minister, I continued to work on the question 
of  Gibraltar. It was —and would remain— a difficult but essential issue. I accorded it the 
highest priority” (p. 435). 
42 In his memoirs, Morán prided himself  on this —and highlighted the support he received 
from President González— in the following terms: “When I left the Government, and 
in subsequent conversations with Felipe González, he reminded me of  the foreign policy 
achievements of  Spain’s first socialist Government. But, he said, in a number of  important 
issues my actions had been accompanied by others. It was only, according to him, on the 
question of  Gibraltar that I had acted almost alone, although I would now add, with his final 
approval. I had planned and implemented a policy on this question from start to finish. This 
was high praise indeed” (Moran, F., España en su sitio, p. 435).
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end of  EEC enlargement negotiations in Brussels in March 1985, under the 
Italian presidency secured by Andreotti43.
Although a staunch pro-Europe advocate convinced that Spain’s future 
lay within Europe, Morán was wary of  any possible negative implications of  
accession to the EEC for Spain’s long-standing claim to Gibraltar. Aware that 
the UK had the dual advantage of  having entered the EEC a decade earlier 
and having achieved a particularly favourable regime for Gibraltar at the time, 
he feared that the UK would leverage this situation to impose unacceptable 
conditions on Spain in relation to Gibraltar, or threaten to veto entry if  Spain 
did not lift the restrictions imposed on communications with Gibraltar during 
the Franco dictatorship44.
Consequently, this constant concern arises frequently in Morán’s 
memoirs, which in turn explains two cornerstones of  his policy: speeding 
up negotiations with his colleague Howe, so that the bilateral agreement 
with the UK on Gibraltar would precede the conclusion of  EEC accession 
negotiations, and seeking to protect Spain from any possible negative 
repercussions of  entry into the EEC for Spain’s claim to Gibraltar, through 
another bilateral agreement on the respective rights and claims in relation to 
Gibraltar. The first was achieved with the Brussels Declaration in November 
1984 and the package of  measures taken and the simultaneous launch of  the 
negotiations on Gibraltar in February 1985, on the eve of  the conclusion 
of  the negotiating process for entry into the EEC; while the second was 
43 On these crucial negotiations and Morán’s involvement in them, see the article by Á. 
viñas and J. A. Yáñez-Barnuevo, “Un tiempo de atrevimiento: la incorporación de España 
a la Unión Europea”, in E. Nasarre and F. Aldecoa (eds.): Treinta años de España en la Unión 
Europea. El camino de un proyecto histórico, Marcial Pons, Madrid, 2015, pp. 45-54.
44 In his parliamentary appearances in 1984 and 1985 and in his memoirs and other subsequent 
statements, Morán always insisted that the British side never formally demanded the lifting of  
restrictive measures on Gibraltar as a prerequisite for Spain’s accession to the EEC. This must 
have been the case, at least at formal bilateral or EEC negotiating tables. However, especially 
in the period prior to Howe’s tenure, the British side made various statements indicating 
that if  this question were not resolved in advance, problems might subsequently arise with 
ratification of  the Act of  Accession by Parliament. In his memoirs, David Hannay (a leading 
British diplomat who was then responsible for EEC accession negotiations with Spain at the 
Foreign Office) mentions confidential contacts in this respect with his Spanish counterparts in 
Madrid, while on a mision assigned by Douglas Hurd, then Foreign Secretary Pym’s second in 
command: see D. hannaY, Britain’s quest for a role, Tauris, London, 2013, pp. 106-107.
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achieved through an Exchange of  Notes between the Foreign Ministers of  
Spain and the UK, both dated in Madrid on 13 June 1985 —the day after 
the formal signing of  the Act of  Accession—, in which they noted their 
common understanding in this regard45.
In short, Morán was determined to advance on two fronts —Spain’s 
accession to the EEC and making progress over Gibraltar— simultaneously, 
with the least possible interference between them. He knew that in the 
long run, Spain would have to accept the acquis communautaire in relation to 
Gibraltar, but he did not want to give the UK any ammunition that might be 
used to hinder the progress of  EEC negotiations, and neither did he want 
the restrictions on Gibraltar to be lifted simply as a result of  applying EEC 
legislation, but rather as the result of  a bilateral Anglo-Spanish agreement 
containing compensation for Spain as regards equality and reciprocity of  
rights and the launch of  a negotiating process that included the issues of  
sovereignty.
This was a complicated task because the balance of  power was then in 
the UK’s favour, among other reasons because of  its established position 
as a member State of  the EEC and Gibraltar’s status within the EEC as 
a “European territory for whose external relations a Member State is 
responsible”, enjoying a particularly favourable regime46. However, Morán 
remained undaunted and attained his fundamental objectives, in collaboration 
with his colleague Howe, who saw Spain as a potential ally for the UK on 
45 This Exchange of  Notes —whereby both States declared that Spain’s accession to the 
EEC did not entail any change in their respective positions on Gibraltar and did not affect 
the bilateral negotiating process established under the Brussels Declaration— was published 
in the Boletín Oficial del Estado (official state gazette) no. 291, of  5 December 1985, and 
formally registered by Spain at the United Nations, all of  which implies that it was considered 
an international agreement, albeit concluded in simplified form. The text is contained in 
La cuestión de Gibraltar, Madrid, 2008, pp. 129-132. Always perceptive, Azopardi does not 
minimize the significance of  that Spain-UK Exchange of  Notes: “Bilateralism was not only 
recognized – it was entrenched” (Sovereignty and the stateless nation…, p. 115).
46 According to the provisions of  the Act of  Accession of  the UK to the EEC in 1973 and 
the stipulations of  Article 227.4 of  the Treaty of  Rome. In general, on Gibraltar’s position in 
relation to the EU, see the studies by R. gozneY, Gibraltar and the EC– Aspects of  the relationship, 
Paper No. 49, Royal Institute of  International Affairs, London, 1993; C. izquierdo, Gibraltar 
en la Unión Europea. Consecuencias sobre el contencioso hispano-británico y el proceso de construcción 
europea. Universidad Autónoma de Madrid/Tecnos, Madrid, 1996; and C. antón, Gibraltar: 
un desafío en la Unión Europea, Tirant lo Blanch, Valencia, 2011. 
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many issues that were at stake within the EEC. Subsequently, things did not 
turn out entirely as envisaged.
The proposals on sovereignty presented by Morán on behalf  of  the Spanish 
Government in February 1985 were the subject of  an acknowledgement by 
Howe on 15 March, simply noting that the British Government would study 
them carefully and again referring to the UK’s commitment to the people of  
Gibraltar in the preamble to the 1969 Constitution of  Gibraltar. Ultimately, 
the British never formally accepted or rejected these proposals, nor did they 
formulate alternatives or inquire about the meaning or scope of  their content, 
as would be expected in a bona fide negotiating process47.
In subsequent months and years, under Morán or his successor, Francisco 
Fernández Ordóñez, whenever the Spanish side asked for a response or 
counter-proposal from London, their British counterparts’ invariable answer 
—always off  the record— was that no formal response was best, because such 
a response would inevitably be negative, and that it was better to avoid the 
fundamental issue and focus instead on the aspects of  cooperation referred 
to in the Declarations of  Lisbon and Brussels in order to move forwards in 
concrete and practical terms, because this might win over public opinion in 
Gibraltar, before moving on to other, more thorny matters48.
Morán well knew that this was the traditional British stance, which was 
why he had insisted that both processes relating to Gibraltar (cooperation in 
practical terms and issues of  sovereignty) move forwards simultaneously. He 
also stressed that with respect to sovereignty, the UK should not limit itself  to 
listening to proposals submitted by Spain, but should also provide feedback 
47 As had been the case, in particular, with the proposals made by Foreign Minister Castiella 
in the talks on Gibraltar with his British colleague, Michael Stewart, which took place in 
London in May 1966, although in the end these exchanges led nowhere. See the so-called 
“second Red Book” on Gibraltar: spain. Ministerio de asuntos exteriores, Negociaciones 
sobre Gibraltar. Documentos presentados a las Cortes Españolas por el Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores. 
Imprenta del M. A. E., Madrid, 1967, passim. 
48 Still in December of  the same year, when Foreign Ministers Howe and Fernández Ordóñez 
were in Madrid to continue the Brussels Process, a joint communiqué mentioned “an 
analysis of  questions of  sovereignty”, which they had “examined in depth” and would “ 
continue through diplomatic channels” (not without the British side recalling once again 
its commitment to the people of  Gibraltar). The text of  the communiqué is given in spain. 
ofiCina de inforMaCión dipLoMátiCa, Reivindicación española de Gibraltar, Ministerio de 
Asuntos Exteriores, Madrid, 1987, p. 69.
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or suggest ideas, because otherwise there could be no progress in dialogue on 
the fundamental issue. Morán’s relatively short tenure as Minister prevented 
him from continuing and furthering this policy with all the strength, skill and 
perseverance that had characterised his actions in this sphere, which he had 
always considered crucial for Spain49.
This did not prevent Morán, once relieved of  any ministerial responsibility, 
from continuing to voice his views in this regard in various writings in 
subsequent years, especially between 1988 and 1994, in which, while respecting 
his ministerial successors, he expressed his concern about the lack of  progress 
in negotiations between the two countries concerning key issues related to 
Gibraltar. Suffice it to cite the last of  these writings, in which, after recalling 
the commitments made by both countries in the  Brussels Declaration and the 
essential content of  the Spanish proposals regarding issues of  sovereignty, he 
condemned the attitude of  successive British Governments, describing the 
procedures they employed as “obstructive delaying tactics”, and concluded 
by appealing for Spain to revive the treatment of   the question ”with utmost 
vigour”. He ended his plea with a cri-de-coeur: “Our stagnation with regard 
to Gibraltar could end up by bringing any attempt to reach a joint vision or 
action to a paralysis. Once more, we are reminded of  the well-founded adage: 
‘Whoever does not make history, suffers it’”50.
There is no doubt that Morán was perfectly aware of  the legacy he 
bequeathed his successors and subsequent generations as regards the 
importance for Spain of  the question of  Gibraltar and the advances he had 
achieved for Spain’s claim. The bitter irony is that some of  his initiatives – 
such as the Brussels process or the idea of  a possible co-sovereignty - were 
then partially continued by several of  the politicians who succeeded him, 
but usually without acknowledging the authorship of  these ideas and, what 
is worse, without always being faithful to the spirit that had inspired them51.
49 All in all, Morán always insisted on the idea that since these were formalised proposals 
that had not been rejected, they constituted a basis for the negotiating process that would 
eventually take place on the future status of  Gibraltar: España en su sitio, p. 432. 
50 F. Morán: “Diez años después”, El País, 28 November 1994, on the tenth anniversary of  
the Brussels Declaration. The closing sentence, whose author is not given, paraphrases part 
of  Albert Camus’s acceptance speech for the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1957.
51 This was especially the case as regards the proposals for co-sovereignty of  Gibraltar 
presented successively by Foreign Ministers Matutes (1997-1998), Piqué (2001-2002) and 
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Another curious irony is that, due to changes in world affairs and European 
policy, a new situation has arisen in recent years that Morán could not have 
anticipated and which casts the issue of  Gibraltar in an entirely different light: 
the decision of  the British people in the referendum held in June 2016 to leave 
the EU and the UK’s consequent withdrawal from the Union (the process 
known as Brexit). This process, which has culminated in the UK’s formally 
leaving the EU on 31 January 2020 but has not yet been completed in all 
aspects, has already exerted an effect on Gibraltar and on relations between 
Spain, the UK and the EU in relation to Gibraltar52.
This is neither the time nor the place to enter into greater detail, but what 
is important to note is that the 27 Member States of  the EU who remain 
in the Union have formally recognised on several occasions and in various 
ways that once the UK withdraws from the EU, Gibraltar —by its very 
nature a dependent territory of  the UK—  also automatically leaves the EU, 
and that any future relationship that Gibraltar may have with the EU will 
have to be based on a prior agreement between the UK and Spain or count 
with the express agreement of  Spain53. Consequently, Spain has received full 
recognition of  its claim to Gibraltar by the EU institutions and member States, 
which clearly strengthens its negotiating position in relation to the UK and the 
Gibraltar authorities.
García-Margallo (2016-2017).
52 On this whole array of  aspects, see M. Martin and J. Martín (eds.), El Brexit y Gibraltar. Un 
reto con oportunidades conjuntas, Colección Escuela Diplomática, no. 23, Ministerio de Asuntos 
Exteriores y de Cooperación, Madrid, 2017.
53 This is made particularly clear in the negotiation guidelines on the UK’s withdrawal from 
the EU, adopted on 29 April 2017 by the European Council, composed of  the Heads of  State 
or Government of  the other 27 Member States, in accordance with the provisions of  Article 
50 of  the Treaty of  Lisbon. Similar decisions have been adopted at different levels at various 
times over the course of  the Brexit  negotiations, and most specifically when concluding 
negotiations for the withdrawal agreement on 25 November 2018, by means of  a series of  
documents: a protocol on Gibraltar, Anglo-Spanish memoranda of  understanding on various 
matters related to Gibraltar, interpretative declarations adopted by the European Council of  
27 and explanatory letters signed by the Presidents of  the European Council and of  the 
Commission and by the UK’s Permanent Representative to the EU indicating agreement. 
These commitments and undertakings have been reaffirmed in the definitive version of  the 
package of  documents constituting the Withdrawal Agreement between the EU and the UK, 
concluded on 12 November 2019, which has entered into force after ratification by both sides 
on 1 February 2020.
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In a way, it could be argued that the two States’ respective positions have 
been reversed compared with the situation when Morán was negotiating with 
Howe: then, the balance of  power was in the UK’s favour, as an EU member 
State, while Spain struggled to become one; now, it is Spain that occupies a 
more favourable position vis-à-vis the UK, as a State who is leaving the Union. 
Ultimately, this is due to the successful efforts of  the Spanish Government of  
the time —led by President González with the key participation of  Morán in 
the negotiations— to ensure Spanish entry into the EEC in good time, under 
the best possible conditions and showing from the beginning a decidedly pro-
European attitude.
Hence, without dismissing —far from it— Morán’s titanic efforts to 
successfully achieve the Brussels Declaration on Gibraltar as having been 
in vain, what in the end will probably yield a greater positive effect from 
the standpoint of  Spanish national interests, including on the question of  
Gibraltar, is Spain’s having become a full and active member of  the EU. 
Consequently, because of  Brexit, the dilemma no longer arises: a bilateral 
and a European approach are no longer potentially contradictory but 
complementary, because they are mutually reinforcing, with beneficial effects 
for Spanish interests. There is no question that Morán played a key role —and 
did so consummately— in both processes, in a historically crucial moment 
for Spain. Without a doubt, Morán was right: through his extraordinary work, 
he contributed decisively to the strategic foreign policy objective undertaken 
by a progressive Spanish Government: to put Spain in its rightful place in 
Europe and in the world.
CGIB03-yañez-estudios-moran.indd   26 06/05/2020   23:52:03
